The European Central Bank’s pandemic bazooka: mandate fulfilment in extraordinary times
This Op-Ed has been elaborated in a chapter of a book (pdf here) EU Law in Times of Pandemic – the EU’s Legal Response to COVID-19, edited by Dolores Utrilla and Anjum Shabbir to be published by Comares.
The last weeks have seen the eruption of a world-wide pandemic of the COVID-19 virus (‘coronavirus’). After to the outbreak of the disease in Wuhan (China), it spread globally, affecting first thousands, then millions of people whose lives were turned upside-down as they were asked, or compelled, to respect ‘social distancing’ to prevent contagion, to stay at home, work at a distance, and self-isolate or go into quarantine. The social and economic effects of the pandemic are huge.
Allow this sociologist cum lawyer to begin with the social disruption before focusing on the legal issues of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s response. Suddenly, values were resurfacing that, in the ‘normal’ economic life of many, had not figured prominently: family life; the environment and Planet Earth; recognition of the vital roles of cleaners, teachers, health workers and other indispensable people for a society to conduct its business – their social status and earnings dismal compared to those of entrepreneurs, innovators and managers; the possibilities of working remotely from one’s ‘home office’ for those whose jobs allows them to do so. One wonders what the effects of this re-evaluation will be over the long term. Simon Kuper offered insights on the possible greening of our societies over time. Of course, any serenity people may feel because of the sudden stillness of their daily lives and the opening of new modes of living only apply to those with the comfort to do so; for people relying on food banks that cease operating, and for refugees on Lesbos, times have become immeasurably harder even.
At policy level, choices that have been mainstream for long seem reversable overnight: the idea of ‘helicopter money’ may have lost its ‘taboo status’, as Martin Sandbu describes. The same holds for a basic income for all; the history of this idea, once considered mainstream and now utopian, has eloquently been described by Rutger Bregman. The joint issuance of bonds by Euro Area governments is proposed by German economists in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ): “Krisen-Anleihen mit einer gemeinschaftlichen Haftung” (crisis bonds under joint liability).
Yet, hitherto national responses have prevailed. One nation goes into ‘lockdown’, the other belatedly orders social distancing. This may be due to local specificities: the severity of contagion, the availability of intensive care units or other considerations. Yet, it seems that governments rely on their own disease control centre’s recommendations as if there were no experience with this abroad (in China, Taiwan, Singapore) or closer by (Italy) and as if there is no European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). In their televised speeches to the nation, neither Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (“We really need to face this task with 17 million”) nor German Chancellor Angela Merkel mentioned Europe or the need for international cooperation. Each referred to its own public health institute. A joint closure of the external borders of the Schengen Areasucceeded border closures of the hitherto barely visible internal borders on which Member States allegedly did not inform each other or the Commission prior to the closures. Similarly, on the economic front, there is no European Union or Euro Area fiscal stimulus, at best a coordinated response. The Eurogroup statement of 16 March sums up national responses and welcomes EU initiatives but did not (could not) release budgetary funds. The envisaged, dismally inadequate budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness that the Euro Area finally agreed upon last year has not yet activated.
EU response is crucial and forthcoming
As in the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC), and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area, effective federal action is needed, and still – mostly – lacking. As said, there is no fiscal stimulus from the centre, as there is no competence to enact such a measure which, just as in 2008, shows that Europe cannot act swiftly as the trans-Atlantic currency union (the US) can. In the GFC, the European Commission and the ECB acted in tandem to save as much as possible the single market and the single currency. They both now have already acted rapidly, each within its own field of competences.
The European Commission adopted a Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak which brings back memories of the adoption of its 2008 Bank Guarantee Communications, ultimately resulting in the 2013 Banking Communication, which the European Court of Justice interpreted in the Kotnik judgment. The first decisions approving coronavirus outbreak-related state support measures have been reported today, a Sunday.
On 12 March 2020, the ECB adopted three big measures:
- Increased provision of liquidity to the markets through Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)
- An increase of € 120 billion in its programme of asset purchases (“a temporary envelope of additional net asset purchases of €120 billion will be added until the end of the year”)
- Extra favourable conditions on Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations; under this TLTRO III, funds that banks report to have on-lent to the real economy, notably to Small and Medium Enterprises, can benefit from an interest rate of up to 25 basis points below the average ECB deposit facility rate.
As banking supervisor, the ECB also adopted measures on 12 March 2020, allowing banks to use capital buffers, to get relief in the composition of capital for Pillar 2 Requirements (i.e., the additional capital a bank needs to hold over the statutory capital under Capital Requirements Regulation as a result of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) pursuant to Article 97 ff. of the Capital Requirements Directive). After announcing on 12 March that it would “consider operational flexibility in the implementation of bank-specific supervisory measures”, the ECB followed up on 20 March with new measures to permit “flexibility in prudential treatment of loans backed by public support measures” and by “introduce[ing]supervisory flexibility regarding the treatment of non-performing loans (NPLs)”. Furthermore, the ECB wants banks to avoid possibly procyclical effects of capital requirements and financial reporting. More importantly perhaps, the ECB postpones for six months the enforcement of major supervisory decisions, such as deadlines for remedial actions imposed as a result of on-site inspections, in the context of the review of internal models to calculate banks’ risk-weighted assets, and other supervisory measures.
The ECB’s main announcement last week was on a new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), explained by ECB President Christine Lagarde. The ESCB will purchase “private and public sector securities” up to € 750 billion. Eligible securities are the marketable instruments that can be purchased under the current Asset Purchasing Programmes (APP). Flexibility is to be the hallmark of the new programme: whereas “the benchmark allocation across jurisdictions will continue to be the capital key of the national central banks”, the buying operations will see fluctuations “over time, across asset classes and among jurisdictions”. Instruments issued by non-financial companies will be included in the commercial paper purchased under the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP). The “main risk parameters of the collateral framework” will be adjusted to allow for wider collateral to be posted at the ESCB. A ‘whatever it takes’ sentence is added, with the necessary reference to the mandate, as in ECB President Mario Draghi’s 2012 statement. The ECB states: “The Governing Council will do everything necessary within its mandate”. This comes right after a wide-ranging statement that includes all sectors of European society:
The Governing Council of the ECB is committed to playing its role in supporting all citizens of the euro area through this extremely challenging time. To that end, the ECB will ensure that all sectors of the economy can benefit from supportive financing conditions that enable them to absorb this shock. This applies equally to families, firms, banks and governments.
Below, I will explore what can be said, at this juncture, about the legality of the ECB’s PEPP.
PEPP and other ECB measures are legal
The primary law legal basis for the emergency response of the ECB is Article 127(1) and (2) TFEU. This provision mandates the ESCB to conduct (‘define and implement’) the monetary policy of the Union and entrusts them to strive for price stability as a primary objective and, as a secondary objective (“Without prejudice to the objective of price stability”), to support the economic policies in the Union “with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 [TEU]”. Article 3(1)(c) TFEU makes clear that monetary policy is an exclusive Union competence, just as “competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market” are an exclusive EU competence pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.
The reference to the secondary objective of the ESCB is relevant for several reasons. First, it puts the support of (hitherto largely national) economic policies in a wider, Union perspective. Second, it makes clear what the Union stands for and which objectives its monetary authority ultimately needs to support, while respecting its prime mandate to maintain price stability. In the current context, special attention is warranted for: the well-being of Europeans (no further explanation needed), their security (which includes physical and mental security, and health), full employment and social progress (which are under severe threat now), combatting social exclusion (think: food banks, refugees), promoting social justice and protection (relevant in the context of mass unemployment; the same holds for:) economic and social cohesion. Furthermore, the Union’s role on the global stage is set in the perspective of, again, the protection of EU citizens an security, the sustainable development of the Earth (which must include conditions that are not conducive to pandemics and which guarantee health for all sentient beings), solidarity and mutual respect among peoples (relevant at this time for international health cooperation) and the protection of human rights (among which the right to life and the right of access to health care).
1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.
3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.
4. The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.
5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
6. The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties.
Relevant for the context of the ECB’s mandate are the so-called integration clauses of the TFEU. These provisions call for consistency among EU policies (Article 7) and notably require adherence to objectives of equality between men and women (Article 8), employment, social protection and health (Article 9), non-discrimination (Article 10), the environment (Article 11), consumer protection (Article 12) and animal welfare (Article 13). This consistency requirement is an additional argument for the ECB’s mandate to be interpreted not as ‘standing aloof’ of the Union’s wider objectives. In the current context, Article 9 is specially relevant:
In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.
This perspective makes clear that the ECB’s mandate includes measures that it considers conducive to the exercise of monetary policy and the support of economic policies with a view to the achievement of the Union’s objectives. A further word on each of these elements.
A further legal basis for the ECB’s PEPP can be found in Article 18.1 ESCB Statute which, as a protocol attached to the TFEU, has Treaty status. It gives the ECB and National Central Banks (NCBs) the power, in order to achieve the ESCB’s objectives and carry out its tasks, inter alia, to buy and sell “claims and marketable instruments” and to conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, on the basis of adequate collateral.
There have been precedents for extraordinary monetary policy measures which have been tested in court. In two references by the German Constitutional Court to the CJEU, the mandate of the ESCB to undertake unconventional measures has been explored when (draft) instruments were reviewed. In Gauweiler, the ECB’s announced Outright Monetary Policy Transactions (OMT) were at issue. In Weiss, the Public Sector Purchasing Programme (PSPP) of the ECB was assessed as falling within its mandate. The PSPP is the quantitatively most significant of the Asset Purchasing Programme (APP), the Quantitative Easing (QE) the ECB engaged in rather late compared to other major central banks (the Bank of Japan, the US Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England). Broadly speaking, under the PSPP, NCBs purchase bonds issued by their own Member States and the ECB buys bonds issued by Euro Area supranational organisations. From these judgments, support for the PEPP can be derived.
Let us recall how the ECJ described how monetary policy influences the economy at large:
“The ability of the ESCB to influence price developments by means of its monetary policy decisions in fact depends, to a great extent, on the transmission of the ‘impulses’ which the ESCB sends out across the money market to the various sectors of the economy. Consequently, if the monetary policy transmission mechanism is disrupted, that is likely to render the ESCB’s decisions ineffective in a part of the euro area and, accordingly, to undermine the singleness of monetary policy. Moreover, since disruption of the transmission mechanism undermines the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the ESCB, that necessarily affects the ESCB’s ability to guarantee price stability. Accordingly, measures that are intended to preserve that transmission mechanism may be regarded as pertaining to the primary objective laid down in Article 127(1) TFEU.” [paragraph 50 Gauweiler]
“(…) the transmission of the ESCB’s monetary policy measures to price trends takes place via, inter alia, facilitation of the supply of credit to the economy and modification of the behaviour of businesses and individuals with regard to investment, consumption and saving.” [paragraph 65 Weiss]
So, the ESCB, having exclusive competence to conduct monetary policy, has a pivotal role to play in the economic conditions of business and individuals, even when economic policies affecting the companies and citizens is primarily in the hands of national governments.
It is important in this context to recall that the Court wisely commented upon the division of competences, with monetary policy an EU matter and economic policies an issue for the Member States: while each sphere belongs primarily to one level of governance, there is no absolute separation:
“(…) the authors of the Treaties did not intend to make an absolute separation between economic and monetary policies.” [paragraph 60 Weiss]
The case law makes clear that the ESCB’s mandate includes the option to ensure that the transmission mechanism functions smoothly:
“the aim of the programme is to safeguard both ‘an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy’.” [paragraph 47 Gauweiler]
“the objective of safeguarding an appropriate transmission of monetary policy is likely both to preserve the singleness of monetary policy and to contribute to its primary objective, which is to maintain price stability.” [paragraph 49 Gauweiler]
The smooth functioning of the monetary policy transmission channels is core to these weeks’ market disturbances. ECB executive directors have squarely tackled this issue in their comments. “We will not tolerate any risks to the smooth transmission of our monetary policy in all jurisdictions of the euro area”, wrote ECB Executive Board Member Philip Lane on 12 March 2020. In her interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) published on 21 March 2020, Isabel Schnabel said:
“Our actions are always determined by our mandate of price stability. And for this we need a functioning transmission mechanism so that monetary policy is passed on to the real economy. That mechanism had recently become impaired, as manifested by the sudden rise in euro area government bond yields. It was affecting all euro area countries, even Germany. When that happens, monetary policy has to step in.” (emphasis added, RS)
Further down, she reiterates that “[t]he central bank must act (…) when the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy is at risk.” Isabel Schnabel’s reasoning may indicate that the ECB’s motivation of the PEPP is still squarely within the first leg of the ESCB’s mandate (price stability). My approach would be that the secondary mandate is also clearly supportive of the PEPP.
Speaking of reasoning, we have to await the legal instruments that the ECB will adopt (at the time of writing these had not yet been published) to evaluate the motivation for the PEPP. The case law makes clear that such reasoning will be scrutinised by the Court based on the preamble of the relevant legal act(s) but can also be found in other communication from the ECB:
“(…) the successive decisions of the ECB relating to the PSPP have consistently been clarified by the publication of press releases, introductory statements of the President of the ECB at press conferences, accompanied by answers to the questions raised by the press, and by the accounts of the ECB Governing Council’s monetary policy meetings, which outline the discussions within that body.” [paragraph 37 Weiss; see, also, paragraph 39 with references to press conferences of the ECB President]
On legal acts to be adopted and possibly reviewed by the Court, it is noteworthy to remark that the CJEU has interpreted a press release and has assessed draft legal acts on the OMT, while it also has based its findings on non-published ECB legal acts in the context of the PSPP. This is clear from:
Although an examination of whether the obligation to provide a statement of reasons has been satisfied may be undertaken only on the basis of a decision that has been formally adopted, in this case it must none the less be found that the press release, together with draft legal acts considered during the meeting of the Governing Council at which the press release was approved, make known the essential elements of a programme such as that announced in the press release and are such as to enable the Court to exercise its power of review. [paragraph 71 Gauweiler; see, also paragraph 28 on the admissibility of a request for a preliminary ruling based on a press release]
and from the Weiss judgment which refers to an unpublished ECB Guideline adopted in the context of the PSPP. As one may feel uncomfortable with the judiciary basing its findings on unpublished legal acts of an active programme such as the PSPP one may expect the ECB to publish the full array of legal acts supporting the PEPP.
There is currently no indication that the PEPP will be used in a selective manner, i.e. to effect interest rates in certain jurisdictions of the Euro Area in particular. The only State-specific measure announced concerns the eligibility of Greek government bonds, hitherto excluded from the PSPP. Should this become so, the case law provides a precedent to support such an outcome:
“As regards the selective nature of the programme announced in the press release, it should be borne in mind that the programme is intended to rectify the disruption to the monetary policy transmission mechanism caused by the specific situation of government bonds issued by certain Member States. In those circumstances, the mere fact that the programme is specifically limited to those government bonds is thus not of a nature to imply, of itself, that the instruments used by the ESCB fall outside the realm of monetary policy. Moreover, no provision of the FEU Treaty requires the ESCB to operate in the financial markets by means of general measures that would necessarily be applicable to all the States of the euro area.” [paragraph 55 Gauweiler]
When confronted with extraordinary, once-in-a-century circumstances, it is clear that the discretion which the European Court allows policy-makers will be widely drawn. In Weiss, the Court made five references to the ESCB’s “broad discretion”.Discretion also figured in Gauweiler. Such broad discretion will not prevent the judiciary from exercising review, when asked. Judicial review will include – beyond adequate reasoning – whether there has been a manifest error of assessment, or a misuse of powers, and whether proportionality has been upheld. Article 5(4) TEU provides:
Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.
“(…) the principle of proportionality requires that acts of the EU institutions be appropriate [should be suitable] for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do [should] not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives” [paragraph 67Gauweiler, paragraph 72 Weiss, with [slightly different wording] between square brackets]
On proportionality, Isabel Schnabel rightly points out that this is a core issue when assessing the legality of measures.
This analysis bodes well for the legality of the ECB’s response to the coronavirus pandemic. One hopes that the CJEU will not be requested to assess this legality, by a Member State or by concerned citizens who have access to constitutional review mechanisms. This is not the time for legal quibbling. Yet, the legality is core to the idea of a society under the rule of law. And it will co-determine the next steps to take: when extraordinary times allow for extraordinary measures they also must lead to reflection on the next steps to avoid a recurrence of unpreparedness. This applies to the health policies: as already set out by Daniel Sarmiento, the protective clause to keep health care a national prerogative may have to be amended. The contours of a EU Health Union might include not only common standards for medical professions but, also, extensive interactions on health research, making the ECDC an authoritative and effective agency in times of health hazards, ensuring the availability of medicines across Europe, and a joint approach to the pharmaceutical industry in price-setting and the availability of medicine for all EU citizens alike, while acknowledging the necessary local character of health care, close to those very citizens.
But let me stick to my field of expertise, the law of the Economic and Monetary Union. Unfinished business is to be taken up once the crisis is over:
- How to treat sovereign risk on banks’ balance sheets equitably and prudently;
- Adopting a European Deposit Insurance System, stalled in the Council;
- Revamping and extending the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), beyond the current re-vamp and, ultimately, integration of the ESM in the Union legal framework, proposed but, again, stalled.
History will not judge lightly those who, between the crises, have organised obstruction to the construction of a stronger union (e.g., joint action in the fiscal field to allow automatic stabilisers to work across the currency union and linking deposit insurance and unemployment insurance schemes), or those outre-Rhin who chose to be deaf to Emmanuel Macron’s recurrent insistence on shaping European sovereignty including in EMU affairs. But quarantine has odd effects of self-reflection on people who suddenly find themselves isolated, ‘en exile’ as Albert Camus eloquently describes in La Peste (1947). Redemption is still possible. Will the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court, BVerfG) wish to mark the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War to issue its judgment in sequel to Weiss by finding that massive buying of government bonds is outside the mandate of the ECB, or of the Bundesbank, or undermines German constitutional identity, as the BVerfG’s deferral of its judgment from 24 May to exactly 5 May lets one surmise? Beyond Europe, as Yuval Noah Harari rightly points out, the pandemic leaves us two choices, “between totalitarian surveillance and citizen empowerment” and “between nationalist isolation and global solidarity”. Thus, beyond Europe, solidarity and cooperation are paramount, now and in the face of climate change. A return to core value of the European integration project is called for.
These are contemplations for the longer term, reflecting on what the coronavirus crisis teaches us as European and as global society, also by way of ‘dress rehearsal’ for the incisive changes in the economy, in transport and food patterns, in short: in our daily living, that the on-going climate change catastrophe will forcefully invite us to make soon. For now, still in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis, Europe’s two federal executive institutions implement their mandates strongly and timely. Focusing on the ECB’s pandemic purchasing programme, in as far as it is known on the basis of the press release, its mandate implementation is firmly within the law of the European Union.
 Which breathed afresh: air quality was reported to have improved significantly above areas closed down for work and transport, with a glimpse to what mankind needs to undertake to avoid a climate change catastrophe, as CNBC reports: “the pandemic’s unintended climate impact offers a glimpse into how countries and corporations are equipped to handle the slower-moving but destructive climate change crisis”.
 The Big Read in the Financial Times, 20 March 2020, entitled: Coronavirus: the moment for helicopter money – Economic taboos are being broken to finance the huge government deficits needed to fight the crisis.
 As does Jonathan Freedland in The Guardian remarked in respect of Great Britain: As fearful Britain shuts down, coronavirus has transformed everything whose words merit citation: “Just as there are no atheists on a sinking ship, there are no free-marketeers in a pandemic.
 Jens Südekum, Gabriel Felbermayr, Michael Hüther, Moritz Schularick, Christoph Trebesch, Peter Bofinger, Sebastan Dullien, Europa muss jetzt finanziell zusammenstehen – Die Starken müssen den Schwachen helfen. Jetzt ist der Moment, wo die oft beschworene Schicksalsgemeinschaft Europa Flagge zeigen muss. Ein Aufruf führender Ökonomen (Europe must now stand financially together – the strong must help the weak. Now is the time when Europe, often implored to be a community of destiny, has to fly the flag. A call from leading economists), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 March 2020.
 “(…) we moeten dit echt met 17 miljoen mensen doen” (official English translation: ‘all 17 million of us will have to work together to overcome it’), television speech by Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, 16 March 2020.
 Herself reportedly in quarantine as I write this: German Chancellor Angela Merkel is in quarantine after a doctor who gave her a vaccine tests positive for coronavirus, The Guardian, 22 March 2020, 17:51 GMT.
 Which the Polish Prime Minister questioned as really a new effort or just a relabelling of existing money flows: Poland criticises EU ‘smoke and mirrors’ coronavirus response – Brussels’ measures insufficient and help for workers should be priority, says finance minister, Financial Times, 20 March 2020.
 See my European supervisors in the credit crisis: issues of competence and competition, in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds.), International Monetary an Financial Law in the light of the Global Crisis, 2010, 305-327.
 Judgment of 19 July 2016 in Case C‑526/14 (Kotnik); ECLI:EU:C:2016:570.
 In favour of two German state aid schemes, and one Italian scheme to support production and supply of medical devices.
12 March 2020.
12 March 2020.
 Press release, ECB Banking Supervision provides temporary capital and operational relief in reaction to coronavirus, 12 March 2020.
 See: FAQs on ECB supervisory measures in reaction to the coronavirus, accessed 22 March 2020.
 Press release, ECB announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), 18 March 2020.
 “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” Verbatim of the remarksmade by Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference in London
26 July 2012.
 In the context of the non-adherence to the monetary union of Denmark, which has an opt-out (Protocol (No 16) on certain provisions relating to Denmark), and of eight other Member States that have a derogation under Article 140 TFEU or their respective accession treaties, for ‘Union’ read: ‘Euro Area’. Article 139 TFEU and Article 42 ESCB Statute regulate the applicability of EMU law provisions to the <out> Member States.
 See Box for the full text of Article 3 TEU with the most relevant terms underlined by me.
 Articles 2 (3) and 5 TFEU make clear that economic policies are coordinated at Union level while national (i.e., State) competences remain prevalent. These competences are exercised in the context of a number of Union directions (Articles 120 and 121 TFEU) and prohibitions (Articles 123–125 TFEU) and procedures (Articles 126 and, for the Euro Area, 136 TFEU). Post-crisis economic governance strengthening have shifted the balance somewhat towards Union competences which, nevertheless, are focused on overseeing national policies.
 Article 127(1) TFEU, Article 2 ESCB Statute.
 Article 127(2) TFEU; see, also, Articles 127(4) and (5) and 128 TFEU; Article 3 ESCB Statute; see, also Articles 4, 5, 16 and 25 ESCB Statute.
 Announced in a press release of 6 September 2012, Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html.
 Philip R. Lane, The Monetary Policy Package: An Analytical Framework, in the ECB Blog, at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2020/html/ecb.blog200313~9e783ea567.en.html.
 Paragraphs 85, 88, 95, 114, 115, 119, 121, 125, 135, 137, 139, 142, 148 refer to Guideline on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/NP3).
 See the letter of 16 January 2019 from ECB President Mario Draghi to MEP Stelios Kouloglou referring to Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the European Central Bank of 19 December 2014 on the implementation of the
Eurosystem monetary policy framework (ECB/2014/60) as the relevant legal instrument to determine whether Greek government bonds meet the minimum credit requirements, specifying that “eligibility for the PSPP is a decision for the ECB Governing Council to take on the basis of its own independent debt sustainability assessment and other risk management considerations. In this regard, a central precondition for PSPP eligibility of Greek government securities is that they fulfil the ECB’s minimum credit requirements”.
 In paragraphs 24, 30, 73, 91 and 92.
 In paragraphs 68, 69 and 75.
 In paragraphs 67-92.
 In paragraphs 72-100.
 When the FAZ asks: “The German Constitutional Court might put a spanner in the works when it rules on the legality of the bond purchases in May”, she answers: “Against this backdrop, it’s important that our measures are proportionate. (…)”.
 Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra is quoted in the Financial Times, 3 December 2018, and in 2018 parliamentary proceedings of 12 December 2018, to have boasted that the proposed budgetary capacity for the Eurozone was an elephant that he managed to turn into a mouse, and a caged mouse at that.
 René Smits, The Invisible Core of Values in the European Integration Project, (2018) 45 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Issue 3, 221–227.